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1 Introduction 
The present paper is a brief critical review of the treatment of nonfinite com-
plements in Huddleston and Pullum 2002 (henceforth: HP
1
). Two outstanding 
features make HP a superior comprehensive grammar of English. One is its 
remarkable clarity of expression. Even more importantly, HP is truly exceptional 
in that it breaks with the long tradition of “description without argumentation.” 
Even though the goal of HP is “to describe the grammatical principles of 
Present-day English rather than to defend or illustrate a theory of grammar,” (p. 
18) the authors make it clear that it is impossible to describe English without a 
theory of grammar because “to bring together the principles that all sentences 
conform to … means developing a theory” (p. 19). As developing a theory 
naturally involves careful argumentation, it is only to be celebrated that “a 
significant amount of space is devoted here to arguing carefully that a particular 
analysis we have decided to adopt, within the framework of the theory we 
assume, is the right analysis” (p. 19). In what follows we will discuss some of 
HP’s central arguments for their analysis of English nonfinites.
2 The presence of for—begging the question 
HP claim that “to-infinitivals with overt subject require the subordinator for” (p. 
1178). The claim is repeated in a slightly different form, saying that “to-
infinitivals containing a subject are always introduced by the subordinator for” 
(ibid.), which is incidentally more accurate, since HP do not recognize non-overt 
subjects in infinitives, therefore the adjective “overt” is redundant, and 
misleading, in the first stylistic variant of the claim. So, infinitives that are 
sometimes characterized as apparently subjectless in grammar are analyzed as 
truly subjectless in HP.  
HP would like to argue that an NP and a following nonfinite VP constitute 
what they call a clause (equivalent in conventional generative terminology to a
sentence) if and only if the NP + VP sequence is introduced by the 
complementizer for, otherwise such an NP is in construction with the matrix 
verb, and is not the subject of the infinitive. For example,  
(1)  I arranged for John to meet my sister. 
                                                     
1 For convenience, with plural subject–verb agreement HP denotes the authors; otherwise it always 
refers to the work.  
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and 
(2)  I wanted John to meet my sister. 
are assigned different structural representations. The string John to meet my 
sister is analyzed as a clause in (1), with John as subject, but not in (2). In the 
latter, John is claimed to be the object of want. 
Unusually, the nonfinite VP which has no subject associated with it in (2) is 
still recognized as a clause—one without a subject. HP assume that subjects are 
not obligatory constituents of sentence structure in what they call “specific non-
canonical constructions such as non-finites and imperatives” (p. 238). 
Technically, this amounts to saying that the Extended Projection Principle (cf. 
Chomsky 1981 and 1982) is assumed for most “canonical” finite clauses, but the 
requirement that sentences have subjects is suspended for nonfinites. The 
apparently unjustified exception that this rather unusual combination of 
assumptions makes for nonfinites has far too many peculiar consequences for us 
to discuss in any detail here. Perhaps it will suffice to point to two that seem 
most directly relevant. One is strange, the other is truly absurd, though partly 
hypothetical.  
An odd, though expected, consequence of the general claim that nonfinites 
are clauses in conjunction with the assumption that subjects are not obligatory 
constituents of infinitives is that sentences like  
(3)  She may like it. 
are biclausal, [like it] being a (subjectless) clausal complement on may (cf. HP, 
p. 215). If this is combined with the standard assumption, apparently not adopted 
by HP, that modal auxiliaries, tense inflections, and infinitival to are of the same 
syntactic category (I for Inflection), then the absurd conclusion follows that even 
the simplest English sentences like  
(4)  John drinks coffee. 
are in fact biclausal, finite -s taking the subjectless clausal complement drink 
coffee.  
A further general consequence directly jeopardizes some of the essential 
categorial and structural assumptions in syntax. Note that on the standard 
assumption that tense inflections and modals fall together in one category, we no 
longer have “finite VPs”, since all VPs are “nonfinite.” More accurately, the 
finite–nonfinite distinction simply no longer applies to VPs. The ±Finite feature 
will be associated with I, the head of the sentence (in HP’s terminology, the 
clause), leaving all VPs “unmarked” for finiteness, as it no longer applies to 
them. The general consequence of this combination of assumptions is that the 
categories VP and “clause” fall together, since, the presence of a subject no 
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longer a requirement of the latter, the two become completely indistinguishable 
from each other. Therefore, HP are forced not to adopt the standard assumption 
that tense inflections, modals, and infinitival to are all realizations of the 
category I, otherwise syntax collapses. We shall not pursue these general issues 
any further here. Our immediate goals are (a) to determine the adequacy of HP’s 
account of the empirical facts and, more importantly, (b) to evaluate the 
consistency or otherwise of the assumptions and the validity of arguments on 
which the account rests. Whatever the conclusions of that analysis, they will be 
directly relevant for the assumption about the exceptional non-obligatoriness of 
subjects in nonfinite clauses. The assumption will be either justified or refuted, 
depending on the adequacy or otherwise of the account it is intended to support. 
A general claim HP make is that all nonfinites are clauses—as noted above, 
some with, some others without a subject, as in the following examples.  
(5) a.  They arranged for the performance to begin at six. 
 b.  They expected the performance to begin at six. 
 c.  They intended (for) the performance to begin at six. 
HP observe that “for is required after arrange, excluded after expect, and 
optional after intend” (1179). The absence of the complementizer for in the 
expect-sentence is taken by HP as evidence that “the infinitival clause has no 
subject” and that the post-verbal NP the performance is not the subject of the 
infinitival clause but the object of the matrix verb (1179). HP also claim that (5c)
has two different structures depending on the presence vs. absence of the 
complementizer—when the complementizer is present, the nonfinite 
complement has a subject (the performance), when it is absent, it does not, and 
then the NP the performance is the object of the matrix verb, not the subject of 
the infinitive.  
Clearly, the presence or absence of the complementizer for is considered 
crucial by HP in determining the constituent membership of the post-verbal NP. 
Interestingly, the same condition is not taken to be decisive about the category of 
the infinitive—it is assumed to be a clause, even when it contains neither a 
subject nor a complementizer, both otherwise standard constituents of clause 
structure, as in (5a). It is interesting to point, in passing, to a conclusion HP do 
not draw from the absence of a complementizer in (5b)—they do not conclude 
that expect has no nonfinite clause complement in (5b). The conclusion that is 
thus forced upon HP, though not discussed in any detail at all, is that expect in 
(5b) takes two separate complements—an NP, which is its object, and a 
nonfinite clause, which contains no subject. The syntactic relation of this 
subjectless nonfinite clause complement to the matrix verb remains obscure. 
Similar conclusions follow for the structure of the intend-sentence(s). When for 
is present, intend takes a single complement—an infinitival clause that has a 
subject and is introduced by a complementizer. When for is absent, the same 
verb takes two complements—an NP object and a subjectless nonfinite clause. 
Among other things, this raises some well-known general issues in connection 
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with the semantic interpretation of nonfinites, which we shall not discuss here 
(for a detailed discussion see Czeglédi to appear).  
To summarize, before we move on, two conclusions are drawn by HP from 
the occurrence or otherwise of the complementizer for. From the presence of for 
HP infer that the post-verbal NP is the subject of the infinitival clause. From the 
absence of for HP infer that the post-verbal NP is not in construction with the 
infinitive, although the infinitival VP still constitutes a (subjectless) clause.  
Setting aside the circularity of the argument for the moment, a missing 
premise is still required for the first conclusion to follow. The missing premise is 
that only clauses are introduced by complementizers. This premise is required 
because without this assumption nothing at all can be directly inferred about the 
syntactic category of the string of words following the complementizer for in 
(5a) and (5c), or about the constituent membership of the post-verbal NP. It is 
only with this required assumption, apparently rejected by HP, that one can infer 
that the material following for is a clause. If this is not assumed, the argument 
does not go through. We return to an additional problem with this argument 
directly, but let us first consider the second conclusion HP would like to draw. 
The second conclusion HP (incorrectly) draw is this: When the com-
plementizer for is not present, it is evidence that the post-verbal NP is not in 
construction with the infinitive. Notice, incidentally, that this conclusion remains 
invalid even if the missing premise mentioned above is adopted. The necessary, 
albeit false, assumption for this conclusion to follow is that a (non-null) 
complementizer is obligatory in clauses with lexical subjects.
2
 Without that
premise, apparently also rejected by HP, nothing at all can be inferred from the 
absence of for about the constituent membership of an NP followed by an 
infinitive. Crucially, two things do not follow from the absence of for, unless its 
obligatoriness is incorrectly assumed. Its absence does not entail that the NP VP 
sequence is not a clause, nor does it follow that the NP is not the subject of the 
nonfinite clause. As is well known, complementizers are in general optional 
elements of clause structure.
3
Therefore nothing is entailed by their absence. 
Let us now return to a final problem with the arguments that center around 
the presence of for. It has to do with the category of for in the examples under 
discussion. HP assume that it is a complementizer. Notice, however, that this 
assumption is absolutely without any justification, unless it is independently 
shown that the structure of the material following for is sentential. If, for 
example, it is not shown without any reference to for that the performance to 
begin at six is a clause in (5a), then there is no justification at all for taking for to 
be a complementizer, rather than a preposition. The only way to derive the non-
prepositional status of for in such examples is by jointly assuming that only 
                                                     
2 Note that a weakened version of this assumption will not do (cf. p. 1179), because to stipulate 
that the complementizer is obligatory only in infinitival clauses (with non-null subjects) would 
only add to the exceptionality of the structure of infinitives, with very little left for a syntactic 
theory to explain about it.  
3 To make things worse for the argument, gerundial clauses never contain a complementizer, a 
serious problem for the theory, to which we shall return briefly in section 4. 
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clauses may be introduced be a complementizer and that the material following 
for is a clause. The latter, however, must be demonstrated independently.  
Note in this connection that, regardless of whether the clausal structure of 
the material following for is assumed or demonstrated, the argument based on 
the presence of for remains circular. It is because if you assume (or demonstrate) 
that verbal structures following for are clauses, you cannot derive this same 
assumption as a conclusion from the presence of for without circularity. Fatally 
for the argument, it involves jointly assuming that for is a complementizer 
(because otherwise it does not follow that the material that follows it is a clause) 
and that the material following this for is a clause (because otherwise it does not 
follow that the for that precedes that material is a complementizer). Clearly, such 
a pair of assumptions will yield neither of them as a conclusion without 
circularity. It is also clear that the circularity of this argument alone is sufficient 
to render invalid the argument based on the absence of for, since the latter is 
derivative on the former.  
Finally, note a counterfactual prediction HP’s theory makes. It is claimed
that for is excluded in expect-sentences like (5b). This incorrectly predicts that 
we do not have sentences like 
(6)  For the performance to begin at six was expected. 
It is instructive that HP seem to feel the need to present “several pieces of 
evidence showing that [the post-verbal NP in for-less examples like (5b) above]
syntactically belongs in the matrix clause” and that the NP and the nonfinite VP 
“do not combine to form a single constituent (a clause) but are separate 
complements of expect” (p. 1179). We now turn to the evidence HP present. 
3 Passivization 
Consider HP’s data first (HP’s [24i, ii, iii] respectively, p. 1179): 
(7) a.  It was arranged for the performance to begin at six. 
 b. * It was expected the performance to begin at six. 
 c.  The performance was expected to begin at six. 
HP take the contrast between (7a) and (7b) in conjunction with the absence of 
for in the latter to be evidence that the post-verbal NP the performance does not 
form a constituent (a clause) with the nonfinite VP that follows it in (5b). The 
argument is that (7b), which involves extraposition of a clausal subject without a 
complementizer, is ungrammatical because the material extraposed is not a 
clause, since it is not introduced by for.  
First, note that the in-situ counterpart of (7b) is equally ungrammatical: 
(8) * The performance to begin at six was expected. 
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Second, note that with the complementizer added, the sentence becomes 
immaculate, cf. (6) above. 
Finally, observe the following contrasts: 
(9) a.  That John will come is likely/expected. 
 b.  It is likely/expected that John will come. 
(10) a. * John will come is likely/expected. 
 b. * It is likely/expected John will come. 
Assuming, quite obviously, that John will come is a sentence in (9)–(10), two 
important conclusions may be drawn from the contrast between them. First, the 
clausehood of the matrix subject (that [John will come]) is totally independent of 
the presence or absence of a complementizer, with or without extraposition. 
Second, regardless of whether or not the subject clause is extraposed, the 
complementizer is obligatory, as it always is in subject clauses. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn from the contrast between (6) and (7b). What the 
ungrammaticality of the latter shows is not that the string the performance to 
begin at six is not a clause in (5b), (7b), and (8), contrary to what HP would like 
to derive, but that a complementizer is obligatory in infinitival subject clauses 
with a lexical subject.  
Now consider the following contrast. 
(11) a.  They wanted the performance to begin at six. 
 b. * The performance was wanted to begin at six. 
HP correctly observe that “passivisation doesn’t provide a necessary condition 
for objects”, and, therefore, they conclude, incorrectly, that (5b) and (11a) must 
be assigned the same structure, in which the post-verbal NP is the object of the 
matrix verb, the residue of the complement being a subjectless infinitival clause 
(p. 1179). Part of the argument is that the contrast between (7c) and (11b) is not, 
in itself, conclusive evidence that they have different structures. This is correct. 
But notice that this alone is absolutely no evidence that they have the same 
structure, as HP would like to assume. If there is independent evidence either 
way, it cannot be ignored. The relevant facts, curiously ignored by HP, are 
represented by the following examples. 
(12) a.  They arranged for the students to attend the lecture. 
 b.  They arranged for the lecture to be attended by the students. 
 c. * They arranged the lecture to be attended by the students. 
 d. * They arranged the students to attend the lecture. 
(13) a.  They expected the students to attend the lecture. 
 b.  They expected the lecture to be attended by the students. 
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(14) a.  They intended (for) the students to attend the lecture. 
 b.  They intended for the lecture to be attended by the students. 
 c.  They intended the lecture to be attended by the students. 
(15) a.  They wanted (for) the students to attend the lecture. 
 b.  They wanted for the lecture to be attended by the students. 
 c.  They wanted the lecture to be attended by the students. 
Several structural properties are clear from these examples. One is that the post-
verbal NP and the nonfinite VP that follows it can be freely passivized (with two 
irrelevant exceptions, to which we will return directly). This is strong evidence 
that the NP and the infinitive that follows it form a clausal constituent in all of 
them, contrary to HP’s ill-derived conclusion. Secondly, it is also clear from the 
examples in (12), (14), and (23) that the passivizability of the material following 
the matrix verb is independent of the presence or absence of the complementizer 
for. In structures where for is optional, passivization is possible either with or 
without it, cf. (14) and (23). Where for is obligatory, both the active and the 
passive for-less structures are ungrammatical, cf. (12). This clearly shows that 
the presence or absence of for is totally independent of the clausehood or 
otherwise of the material that follows it. It may be required, as in (12), it may be 
optional, as in (14) and (23), or it may be forbidden, as in (13), but this has 
nothing to do with the category or constituent structure of NP to-VP sequences.
It is required, optional, or forbidden for independent reasons. Therefore, 
crucially, its absence is no evidence at all for the non-clausehood of the post-
verbal NP to-VP sequence. It is puzzling that in the relevant context HP make no 
reference to data of the kind just discussed, though similar facts and their 
parallelism with passive finite clauses are not only observed but taken as 
evidence for constituent structure elsewhere (cf. p. 1183).  
HP (incorrectly) assign the same structure to want-sentences like (15) and 
expect-sentences like (13a) or (5b). They also claim that the latter have the same 
structure as persuade-sentences like 
(16) a.  They persuaded the students to attend the lecture. 
 b. * They persuaded the lecture to be attended by the students. 
As the contrast between (13b) and (16b) clearly shows, that is not correct. HP’s 
general conclusion is that “there is no construction where the sequence NP + to-
infinitival, with no preceding for, behaves as a subordinate clause, a single 
constituent” (1181). As we have seen, this conclusion is quite clearly both 
invalid and false. 
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4 Cases overlooked 
HP seem to have overlooked some important empirical facts, including, in-
terestingly, some cases they otherwise discuss. One of these is there-infinitives 
in sentences like  
(17)  It’s essential for there to be no misunderstanding on this point. (p. 
1183) 
(18)   I intended there to be more time for discussion. (p. 1232) 
(19)  We mustn’t allow there to be any repetition of this behaviour. (p. 
1234) 
(17) is quoted as evidence that, because “NPs following for [in such sentences] 
are the same as those which occur as subject of finite main clauses,” including, 
importantly, “dummy there,” which “occurs freely here,” for must be analyzed 
as a complementizer (pp. 1182–83). This is correct. In a slightly simplified 
paraphrase, the argument is that if the presence of there is treated as independent 
evidence that there to be no misunderstanding on this point is a clause in (17), 
then the for that introduces it must be a complementizer. What does this
argument tell us about the constituent structure of infinitives and the category of 
for that may introduce them? Before drawing the fairly obvious conclusion, 
consider some important empirical facts that HP overlook. Clauses like the one 
just discussed occur freely as complements without for, as the following 
examples, as well as (18) and (19) above, show. 
(20)  They expect there to be no misunderstanding on this point. 
(21)  They want there to be no misunderstanding on this point. 
As the argument suggests, and as these for-less data show, the clausehood (or 
otherwise) of infinitives is independent of the presence of for. In addition, the 
argument quite clearly, and correctly, implies that for us to conclude anything 
about the category of for in sentences like (17) and, in general, in sentences 
where for introduces infinitives, we must first establish the constituent structure 
and category of the material that follows it. Therefore, any attempt to reverse the 
argument by inferring anything about the constituent structure of infinitives from 
the presence or absence of for leads to the kind of circularity we discussed in 
detail in section 2.  
A possible reason why HP apparently ignore the circularity of the ar-
guments centering around the presence or absence of for in infinitival com-
plements might the insufficient amount of attention paid to infinitives (and 
gerunds) with expletive subjects. As is well known, pleonastic there is 
obligatory in the infinitives above, as well as in gerunds and finite clauses of 
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essentially the same structure, which is the chief motivation for the general 
requirement that sentences must have subjects (first proposed in Chomsky 1981 
and later identified as the Extended Projection Principle in Chomsky 1982). This 
requirement is not adopted by HP, who assume instead that nonfinite clauses 
may occur with or without a subject, as already noted. Beyond the superficial 
appearance of some apparently subjectless infinitives and gerunds, this 
assumption remains without any motivation. Worse still, it is in conflict with the 
fact that pleonastic there is obligatory in the infinitives discussed above. 
In addition to the resulting descriptive inadequacies and inconsistencies we 
have noted, which are more or less directly related to this unmotivated (but 
forced) assumption HP adopt, we finally note a problem the assumption creates 
for the analysis of gerunds. If, in absence of the requirement that sentences have 
subjects, the central argument in the analysis of nonfinites is that an NP 
preceding a nonfinite VP is a constituent of the matrix clause unless it is 
preceded by a complementizer, the analysis of gerunds in sentences like 
(22)  I don’t mind / hate / resent / saw / caught you drinking beer.
becomes extremely troublesome, as gerunds, with or without a lexical subject, 
are never introduced by a complementizer.  
Since arguments based on the presence or absence of for, considered 
decisive in determining the structural position of post-verbal NPs in infinitives, 
are inapplicable in the analysis of gerunds, whatever problems their structural 
analysis presents must be resolved differently. Indeed, HP turn to a different set 
of empirical facts and regard some familiar facts differently in their analysis of
gerunds, which renders the argumentation partially inconsistent. For example, 
the possibility or otherwise of passivization around the matrix verb or/and in the 
complement, largely ignored in the analysis of infinitives, is taken as evidence of 
constituent structure in the treatment of gerunds. In the analysis of infinitival 
complements on want in sentences like (23a), for instance,  
(23) a.  They wanted the students to attend the lecture. 
 b.  They wanted the lecture to be attended by the students. 
 c. * The students were wanted by them to attend the lecture. 
the availability of the embedded passive in (23b) and the non-existence of the 
matrix passive in (23c) are dismissed as irrelevant to the problem of whether the 
NP the students is the object of the matrix verb or the subject of the embedded 
sentence in (23a). On the other hand, in the analysis of gerunds, the existence of 
(24b) with a passive clause complement,  
(24) a.  I resented Kim mistreating my cat.
 b.  I resented my cat being mistreated by Kim. 
 c. * Kim was resented mistreating my cat. 
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the non-existence of the matrix passive in (24c), and the fact that (24ab) are 
synonyms are quoted as “the familiar kind of evidence” that supports the 
structural analysis, as well as semantic interpretation, on which the post-verbal 
NP Kim is the subject of the complement clause rather than the object of the 
matrix verb in (24a) (cf. pp. 1204–05). Clearly, no part of the facts represented 
in (23–24) may be ignored in a consistent account of the structure of English 
infinitives and gerunds. 
5 “A shoulder on which for you to weep”
Before we conclude, it is appropriate to make a final brief note of a descriptive 
point in connection with nonfinite relative clauses and the way they are treated 
in HP. Apparently because it is incorrectly assumed that infinitival relative 
clauses never contain for, HP claim that they “cannot contain an overt subject” 
(1264). This is factually not correct, as the expression chosen for the title of this 
section and some more examples below demonstrate. 
(25)  As Smither has no record on this issue on which for you to squeal like 
a spoiled child pointing a finger…
(26)  a permanent and invariable general basis on which for you to act in 
future 
(27)  something for writers to reflect on 
(28)  It will make our community a safer and healthier place in which for us 
to live, and a more conducive environment for college students to 
learn. 
(29)  That is a useful point at which for us to conclude. 
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